The unprecedented and controversial series of events occurring in Ottawa continued most recently with internationally renowned academic turned Toronto politician, Michael Ignatieff, taking control of the Liberal Party of Canada. The former Harvard human rights professor and BBC television personality was named leader of the official opposition following a disastrous run at the helm by Stephane Dion, who was forced to resign earlier than expected due to a lack of support by the Liberal parliamentary caucus and national executive.

After a surprise win at the 2006 Liberal leadership convention, Dion led the Liberals to one of their worst electoral defeats in Canadian history in the 2008. The process to elect his successor began following this resounding loss, with Dion announcing his resignation and planned date of departure to be May 2009. Despite that, this past December, Dion acted upon what he saw as a sly and economically weak budget outline put forward by Prime Minister Stephen Harper. Citing the lack of a stimulus package to combat the current economic crisis and the inclusion of a highly partisan proposal to end public subsidies for political parties, Dion struck an agreement with the New Democratic Party leader Jack Layton to form a coalition government, with the support of Bloc Quebecois leader Gilles Duceppe. The Harper government would fall facing a vote of non-confidence and the new coalition would request the Governor General, Michaelle Jean, to allow them to form a new government.

The Canadian public reacted negatively to this agreement and public opinion polls showed the Conservative party surpassing its traditional barrier of 40 percent national support following the announcement of the coalition. However, the momentum of this new coalition was slowed by Prime Minister Harper’s request to prorogue parliament. The Governor General agreed and suspended parliament until January, denying the coalition an opportunity to take down the government with a motion of non-confidence. When Parliament returns in January there will be a revised budget and a similar situation will replay. Either the budget will pass and the Conservatives will remain in power; there will be a vote of non-confidence leading the Governor General to ask the coalition to form government; or she will call another election entirely. With a possible election looming, Dion’s own party put pressure on him to expedite his planned departure, suggesting that a stronger leader should be in place before the planned May 2009 Leadership Convention in case of an early election.

Under these circumstances Michael Ignatieff rose to his new position. While the Liberal Party’s constitution dictates that the leader is chosen at a delegated convention, interim leaders are decided upon by the national executive on the recommendation of the parliamentary caucus. Ignatieff’s support within these two groups allowed him to leap-frog over his competition to be named as interim leader. Dominic LeBlanc, politically experienced but representing a next generation, dropped out of the Liberal leadership race to enthusiastically endorse Ignatieff. Bob Rae, the former Ontario Premier and Ignatieff’s main rival, strongly criticized the lack of consultation among all party members but eventually endorsed Ignatieff graciously. Ignatieff’s strength and eventual victory lay in the strong support he held in the upper ranks of the party.

Ignatieff now faces a vote by party delegates in May 2009 in order to move from his interim position to become the Leader of the Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition. If successful he will inherit a party with the lowest seat count in its long history, a terrible fundraising apparatus, and a virtual lack of support in Western Canada; and will be facing a strong and united government, under an experienced political strategist in Stephen Harper. Further, the controversial manner in which Ignatieff gained control of the party will likely alienate some of its members, particularly those who supported Bob Rae. These issues, combined with his 30 years as an expatriate and patrician upbringing, suggest that Ignatieff will have a particularly difficult task in gaining positive association with Canadians.

More difficult will be the task of renewing the Liberal Party itself. Although it has seen better days, many incumbent party activists still relish the authority they gain by controlling the party apparatus. These individuals have entrenched a set of qualities and practices that have brought short term gains but resulted in long term difficulties. The party had become completely reliant on large corporate donations which are no longer permitted; on mobilizing “instant Liberals” en masse who provide no certain commitment to future causes; and on taking advantage of ethnic and identity based organizations. Moreover, these practices have limited external consultation in the policy and organizational sphere and reduced the use of new technology in the political process.

The purpose of this paper is not to suggest which areas Michael Ignatieff should change in order to make the Liberal Party thrive, as it is likely that he already has a long list in mind. Instead, by using the framework created by Harvard Business School organizational design expert Professor John P. Kotter, this article will suggest a strategy the new Liberal leader can take in order to implement the necessary changes successfully. As written in his famous paper “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail” Kotter instructs that leading change is absolutely vital and tremendously difficult: as no business can flourish continuously without reinventing itself, and because most incumbents will resist change. Kotter provides eight steps for transformational change which should be applied to Michael Ignatieff’s efforts at reforming the Liberal Party of Canada.

Step 1: Establishing a Sense of Urgency

Kotter writes that an organizational transformation requires a strong sense of motivation and the thorough cooperation of incumbent actors. Without at least 75 percent of key decision makers feeling strongly dissatisfied with the current state of the organization, a full fledged change is unlikely to receive the necessary buy-in. To establish a necessary sense of urgency for party members, Ignatieff must vocalize the dangers which the Liberal Party faces if an election is called following the resumption of Parliament in late January. The incredible unpopularity of Stephan Dion’s coalition has strengthened Stephen Harper’s position and could result in a Conservative majority government, particularly if Liberals are unable to work together. The increased likelihood of a Conservative majority should galvanize even the most active Ignatieff critics within the Liberal Party as it would result in the implementation of policies which would not only reduce the capacity of the social institutions Liberals hold dear, but likely target the Liberal Party itself. Although it would be in the interest of some party members to see Ignatieff fail, if he were to practically state the negative implications for the Liberal Party and the Canadian public at large in the event of a Conservative majority -and do this rationally, without fear-mongering- Ignatieff should likely to able to capture the necessary 75 percent of key decision makers needed to move forward.

Step 2: Forming a Powerful Guiding Coalition

Not to be mistaken with the type of coalition sought after by Stephen Dion, in accordance with Kotter’s framework, Ignatieff must bring together a group of capable activists within the party who share his dedication to the cause of change. Although he was branded as the establishment candidate during the 2006 leadership race, Ignatieff has surrounded himself with a group of advisors generally unattached to the infighting notorious with the Liberal Party and formed a core team made up of young but capable new-comers as well as and party stalwarts excluded from the last set of leadership coteries. To be truly successful Ignatieff must expand this base and create a “team of rivals” composed of all capable Liberals who believe in change, despite their past affiliations to leadership contenders. Ignatieff must ensure that organizers across the nation realize the importance of political maturity and follow this same model of inclusion, acceptance, and forgiveness. If he does not bring them to the decision making table, Ignatieff’s opponents will gathers together and stop his momentum in the change effort.

Step 3: Creating a Vision

“Without a sensible vision, a transformation effort can easily dissolve into a list of confusing and incompatible projects that can take the organization in the wrong direction or nowhere at all”, states Kotter. To members of the Liberal Party the accuracy of this argument was proven by the disappointment experienced during the tenure of Prime Minister Paul Martin. Despite his hero’s status as Finance Minister, incredible organizational and fundraising strength, and natural intelligence, Martin’s vision as Prime Minister was likely seen by the average Canadian as complicated. While advocates would passionately argue for the philosophical logic behind his decision making, Martin’s vision could not be easily communicated in five minutes or less as necessitated by Kotter, let alone the five seconds required by mainstream media and television sound bites.

Ignatieff must remind Canadians what the Liberal Party stands for in its most fundamental sense and be able to do this succinctly. Already, his traditional stump speech reminds audiences of the importance of public goods and the role of government to provide them, as well as the prosperity associated with of efficient and fair markets. He has a keen ability to weave essential themes together under the banner of nationhood, from food policy to corporate tax practices to early childhood learning. Yet, these broad themes must be simplified during the next electoral campaign. For Mr. Ignatieff, “Change” and “Hope” may not be sufficient considering the resentfulness of Quebecers or the long memories of those in the West.

Step 4: Communicating the Vision

Once Ignatieff has simplified his fundamental vision he must be disciplined enough to use all possible mechanisms to communicate it to Canadians. In the 2006 leadership campaign his newcomer status was clear as he gained a reputation for being gaffe-prone. The words were his alone, and as such the errors were his fault, but the inability to lessen their impact can be blamed on an inexperienced communications team. Recently, Mr. Ignatieff has show that he is a quick learner, often outshining all others with his oratory skills in the House of Commons, a likely cause of his strong support in caucus. Still, in front of a media eager to seize on any small missteps, Ignatieff must ensure that he and his team are fully capable of sticking to the message and controlling the agenda instead of being forced on the defensive. He must also remember that he is a symbol of his vision. Actions and words relating to him, whether in front of a media scrum or in a smoke filled back rooms, will send stronger signals to Canadians about his character and intentions than the even the most repetitive 30 second media buy.

Step 5: Empowering Others to Act on the Vision

Kotter tells us that renewal requires the removal of obstacles; whether in the form of a current organizational structure or incumbent individuals whose self-interest does not allow for change. To reform the Liberal Party of Canada, Ignatieff will have to remove the strongest opponents to change, but do so in a manner which is fair and consistent with the new vision. This is easier said than done. Losing the balance between organizational discipline and party infighting caused the erosion of the party in the first place. One option for Ignatieff is the encouragement of risk taking and nontraditional ideas. Allowing suggestions from individuals outside of the Opposition Leader’s Office will help those who may not be in complete agreement maintain a place in the party which adds value. Further, it will empower others to act on the vision, resulting in the creation of new loyalty to the party’s new leader. Communications technologies such as the internet and cell phones will make this simpler, as the grassroots will be able to have a say in decisions and as a result feel more compelled to follow Ignatieff through his ups and downs.

Step 6. Planning for and Creating Short-Term Wins

One cause of Stephane Dion’s rapid demise as leader was his inability to produce any sort of short term victory for his supporters after his December 2006 leadership nomination. Not in the form of communications wins on the daily news or in election results. Continued losses ground what little momentum Dion had to a complete halt and made it easy for detractors to urge his removal.  Kotters suggests that unless compelling evidence is shown immediately, within the first 12 to 24 months of the initial change sequence, most followers will not be willing to continue providing support. In the realm of politics this initial period of 12 to 14 months is cut drastically short.

Ignatieff must keep this in mind and ensure the creation of short term wins. This can be done by continuously finding ways to obtain clear performance improvements within the party apparatus, be it through improvements in quarterly fundraising or increasing membership in regions of the country with few registered Liberals. Another method to achieve this is legislative victories created by collaborating with the government or the opposition. The Prime Minister’s suggested openness to Liberal input on an economic stimulus is a starting point. If Ignatieff can force in a bipartisan but put noticeably liberal social policy piece, such as research and development funding or education spending, it would send an inspiration signal to the troops on the ground.

Step 7: Consolidating Improvements without Declaring Victory Too Soon

With a few strong short term wins Liberals will be quick to reclaim their title as “Canada’s natural ruling party” and forget that the recent spate of losses was not caused because Canadians were punishing them solely for bad behavior, such as in the sponsorship scandal, but because of genuine structural and political short-comings. Kotter points out that it will be easy to declare victory too soon, as party reformers will be eager to say that they were right, and resistors of reform will quickly join and push to stop the change by stating that the war has been won. The general consensus that victory has been achieved will stop the change process, bringing traditional methods and short cuts back into practice. When he is successful Ignatieff must use the increased political capital and credibility brought along with each new short term victory to tackle the next set of problems on his change agenda. To ensure the continuation of change Ignatieff must not solely maintain his stable of advisors, as is usually the custom in Canadian politics, but must reinvigorate the leadership process by bringing in new projects, themes, and change agents.

Step 8: Institutionalizing New Approaches

The most lasting change Ignatieff can make to ensure that the Liberal Party does not fall back into its success trap will come from embedding a the concept of change within the party’s culture. By making a conscious attempt to show party members how the new approaches and behaviors have helped improve performance, Ignatieff will highlight the importance of adhering to the new brand of the Liberal Party: a more accepting and encouraging institution with broad based principles and a national support network. Similarly, he must strategically ensure that the next generation of top decision-makers, whether freshmen Members of Parliament or youth organizers, understand and personify the new approach. By teaching the next generation of decision makers the mistakes of the past and methods for avoiding repetition, Ignatieff can grow the party into success for generations to come.